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RECOGNITION OF A STAFF UNION OF BUSINESS AGENTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
IN recent years staff employees of several unions have organized their own
unions to represent them in collective bargaining,1 and these unions have been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board.2 Since most employing unions
have agreed to bargain with staff unions, the refusal of the Ladies' Garment
Workers to bargain with a certified staff union that includes business agents 3
presents a marked contrast to this trend. The struggle between the Garment
Workers and the staff union, the Federation of Union Representatives, 4 has
been carried on in NLRB proceedings for two years, and it will probably soon
reach the courts for a final decision. To the usual mutual recriminations char-
acteristic of every labor dispute, there is added in this case the claim by each
side that it represents the pure spirit of trade unionism.3
1. Staff unions have been organized in the Newspaper Guild, the Airline Pilots',
Teachers', Insurance Workers', Chemical Workers', Oil and Chemical Workers', Rubber
Workers', Papermakers', and Electrical Workers' Unions, and in the AFL-CIO. Benson,
When Organizers Organize, in REPRINTS ON UNION DEmOCRACY IN ACTI N No. 2 at 2,
These staff unions represent organizers, business agents, international representatives, edu-
cation directors, and others in administrative positions in the unions.
2. E.g., Textile Workers of America, 138 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1962); International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 131 N.L.R.B. 111 (1961) ; AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969
(1958) ; Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951).
3. The business agents, who make up the largest part of the staff union's membership,
are the chief source of controversy, the ILGWU having offered to recognize a unit of
organizers. Brief for Respondent, p. 5, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 131
N.L.R.B. 111 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as ILGWU Brief.]
4. On December 18, 1960, the Federation of Union Representatives [hereinafter re-
ferred to as FOUR] petitioned, the ILGWU for recognition as bargaining agent for a unit
composed of business agents, organizers, and staff members doing union label, political,
and educational work. Only staff members on the International's payroll (as distinguished
from its locals') were included in the unit. The ILGWU's General Executive Board
refused and decided to contest the staff union's certification. Responding to a petition by
FOUR under § 9(c) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB called a
representation election for March 12, 1961. Ballots were contested, and FOUR was not
finally certified until July 23, 1962. Since then, President Dubinsky has refused to bargain
with the certified staff union. In the course of the protracted dispute FOUR brought
charges of unfair labor practices against the ILGWU, alleging discharges and "coercive aid
discriminatory conduct". The NLRB trial examiner found that the ILGWU had committed
some of the practices alleged, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Federa-
tion of Union Representatives, Cases No. 2-CA-7857-1 and 2-CA-7923, Trial Examiner's
Report, and his decision is being appealed to the Board by both parties.
5. President Dubinsky argues that the ILGWU staff members have succumbed to "the
commercialism of our times" and have lost the sense of the union as a mission. Appendix to
ILGWU Brief, p. 5. On the other hand, FOUR says that the ILGWU has "put into jeopardy
the right to union representation" of large classes of workers. FOUR folder, "LABOR
DAY I Organized Labor Marches In Dignity I"
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The National Labor Relations Act excepts from its definition of employer
"any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer)."O In
Airline Pilots Ass'n.7 the NLRB, stating that a union would be treated the
same as any other employer vis-a-vis its own employees, upheld the right of
the union employees to organize. Four years later, in Oregon Teamsters'
Security Plan Office,8 the Board, reversing this holding, declined as a matter
of discretion to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes in which the employer
was a union.9 Referring to its decisions declining jurisdiction over non-profit
organizations,'0 the Board held that the policies of the act would not be
effectuated by the assertion of jurisdiction in cases where the employer was a
union. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, although the Board could
decline to assert jurisdiction in particular cases, it could not make a whole-
sale exclusion of labor unions as employers in the face of the provision in the
NLRA that unions should be treated as employers when they act as em-
ployers.
11
The Oregon Teamsters case involved office-clerical employees. Subsequent
cases have involved union employees in higher positions in the union hierarchy,
but the Board has asserted jurisdiction in every case, not recognizing any in-
stance in which the policies of the act would better be effectuated by declining
jurisdiction.12
The role and function of business agents and their lack of control over the
conditions of their employment bring them within the definition of employees
as that term is used in the act. In general, business agents serve as a liaison
between the union administration and the membership and mediate at the
lowest level between the workers and. the primary employer, handling griev-
ances in the shops, policing the collective argeements, and helping to adminis-
ter and service the locals.' 3 More responsible tasks are usually reserved for
6. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1958). [Hereinafter cited as NLRA.]
7. 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951). The decision ordered separate representation elections for
staff employees: one for professional employees, including attorneys, engineers, and a sta-
tistician; another for non-professional employees, including contract negotiators, the pub-
licity man, and the Washington representative.
8. 113 N.L.R.B. 987 (1955).
9. Id. at 990.
10. Ibid.
11. Office Employees' Int'l. Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
12. Cases cited supra note 2.
13. ILGWU Brief, pp. 15-22. In the ILGWVU's Connecticut district4 for example, there
are three business agents, all stationed in New Haven, who work under a district leader and
make daily rounds in the state. They run the local meetings, but when contracts are to be
negotiated, the district leader takes charge. The focus of their attention is on local matters.
Interview with ILGWU Business Agent, November, 1962. Contrast the situation of the
elected business agent in- the building trades as described in BAmwASH, LAPe0's GnAss ROMts,
ch. 5 (1961). Their greater independence from the International and their autonomous
power, as contrasted to that of the ILGVUs business agents, point up the fact that "business
agent" is a term of no fixed meaning. Therefore, with each petition for certification of a
staff union including business agents in the unit, the Board should consider the actual duties
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the district managers. Business agents generally serve without contracts and
are subject to dismissal at any time.14 The salaries of ILGWU business agents
range from $65 to $110 per week plus fixed expenses.15 It therefore seems
clear that business agents are prey "to the evils the statute was designed to
eradicate" ;16 inequality of bargaining power with its concomitant, lack of con-
trol over wages.17 Stated differently, they are as much in need of collective or-
ganization as any other class of protected employees.
Some employees, however, are denied the protection of the act because of
other policy considerations, notwithstanding that these employees would
benefit from collective organization. The principal policy which has led to this
restriction rests on a concern for the efficient operation of the employer's
business and a desire not to impair the loyalty of certain employees. The Board
has implemented this policy by excluding from the protection of the act those
employees "who formulate, determine, and effectuate an employer's policy." 18
The organizational and collective bargaining activities of these employees are
not protected, at least under federal law, against employer coercion, restraint,
or interference.19
The ILGWU argues that its business agents fall within this category of
managerial employees. In support, it cites the influence that business agents
exert through daily contact with the rank and file and the fact that they are
eligible to be delegates to the triennial International Convention. The in-
fluence of business agents, however, is for the most part limited to the com-
munication of official policies formulated at higher levels of authority. The
performance of their jobs leaves little opportunity for the kind of independent
policy-formulation envisaged by the Board's definition. As to their eligibility to
serve as convention delegates, the lack of actual choice of candidates at the
ILGWU and other union conventions, 21 the relative impotence of convention
performed by the business agents involved. In this Note, the term business agent will be
used for those who perform functions roughly similar to those described in the text. The
forty or fifty per cent of the ILGWU's business agents who are elected and paid by their
locals, generally located in the large urban centers, are not involved in FOUR,
14. The business agents in the ILGWU deliver signed resignations when they begin
work. Brief for Petitioner, p. 5, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 131 N.L.
R.B. 111 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as FOUR Brief.]
15. ILGWU Brief, p. 26. Many other unions pay their staff members more; as of 1961
the highest appeared to be was the Plumbers' Union, which paid its staff members $15,000
per year. FOUR Newsletter, April 25, 1961.
16. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944).
17. NLRA § 1.
18. AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969, 973 (1958). And see, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946); American Broadcasting Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79 (1953).
19. This is not to say that managerial employees cannot form a union. It only means that
such a union is denied the protection of the act, and union-employer relations are left to be
settled by economic force.
20. ILGWU Brief, pp. 37-39.
21. In a study of thirty-four unions between 1900 and 1948, Philip Taft found that of
2,307 elections of general officers, only 537 were contested. Of 254 elections in the
ILGWU, 53 have been contested; and no general offices in the ILGWU werd contested from
1937 to 1954. TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVEaNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 38-39, 46 (1954).
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actions,2 2 and the small number of business agents actually chosen as dele-
gates 23 indicate that the effect on the employing union's policy and administra-
tion of any conflict of interest on the part of the business agents in serving
as convention delegates would be minimal.
2 4
In resolving the conflict between the policy of encouraging collective bar-
gaining and that of minimizing certain interferences with an employer's busi-
ness operations, Congress has excluded another category of employees. Re-
sponding to opposition generated by a Supreme Court decision holding that
foremen were employees,2 5 Congress provided in Taft-Hartley that supervisors
were beyond the purview of the NLRB. A supervisor is defined as "any in-
dividual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, sus-
pend,... or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them...."-
This provision, however, has no direct application to business agents, for the
definition is written wholly in terms of authority over other employees. Busi-
ness agents, on the lowest level of union bureaucracy, have no such authority.
Arguably, however, the policy underlying this provision reaches business agents
as well as foremen. Foremen are denied the right to organize in order to in-
sure that the employer's interests will be faithfully represented in the shop.
And if management's representatives to labor cannot organize under the act,
labor's representatives to management-the business agents--should not be
22. In most instances the union convention is an expertly managed affair designed to
give the delegates, and through them the membership, a sense of the union's im-
portance. . . . The convention provides an opportunity for a few men from each local
to have what approximates a good time at the union's expense. ... When dissension
does come out in convention session, it may not be unusual for somebody to weaken
the dissenter's position by saying that the open criticism of the union's policies can
only give "aid and comfort" to the employers.
BARBASH, THE PRAcTIcE or Umomsm, 60-61 (1956).
Conventions do, of course, present an opportunity for resolving differences, holding
officers to account, and, occasionally, for openly debating union policies.
Id. at 61-62.
23. At the ILGWU's 1959 convention, no more than thirteen of approximately 960 dele-
gates were members of the bargaining unit represented by FOUR. FOUR Brief, p. 14.
24. In the analogous situation of employees who hold stock in the employer corpora-
tion, the Board has held that an insignificant interest should not exclude an employee from a
rank and file union. A stockholder employee should be excluded only if he has "an effec-
tive voice in the formulation and determination of corporate policy." Alderwood Products
Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 136, 138 (1949). A similar test should be applied to business agents. If
the employing union is anxious about the effects of even this small conflict of interest, it
could probably make business agents ineligible to serve as convention delegates. While the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), §
101(a) (1), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. II 1959) [hereinafter cited as
Landrum-Griffin] guarantees equal rights and privileges to every union member, the
guarantee is subject to "reasonable rules and regulations.' Making business agents ineligible
to serve as convention delegates seems to be a reasonable regulation.
25. -Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
26. Labor-Mkanageunent Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1958) (emphasis added). [Hereinafter cited as LMRA.]
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permitted to organize either 2 7 However appealing aesthetically, the argument
is founded on the questionable assumption that organization for collective bar-
gaining is, in every case, incompatible with loyal and effective representation
of the employer. In excluding supervisors from the coverage of the act,
Congress was not framing a general postulate of this sort to serve as a major
premise for deciding subsequent cases. They had before them empirical evi-
dence that the organization of foremen led to the growth of a sympathetic tie
between foremen and the plant unions, and a consequent decline of loyalty
to management.28 The foreman's job requires him to deal with the employees'
union in an adverse capacity; therefore, any growth of sympathy for the
union would'mean a corresponding decline in loyalty to the employer. Also,
the success of any foremen's union would depend on retaining the sympathy of
the rank and file union, creating an obvious conflict of interests. These con-
siderations would not be present with a union of business agents; although
their union would give them some independence of the employing union,
no similar reason appears for a decline in their loyalty in representing the
union's interest. Unlike the case with unionized foremen, sympathy for fellow-
employees, the members of the employing union, would lead the business agents
to do a better job of representing. And there is no community of interest be-
tween the staff union and the primary employer.
Therefore since business agents are employees in the sense that they are as
much in need of the protection of the act as other employees, and since they do
not come under the Board's definition of managerial employees or the act's
definition of supervisors, the Board seems correct in concluding that business
agents are within the coverage of the NLRA. Since staff employees fulfill an
important role in the union's internal structure, however, recognition of a staff
union poses considerations not present where ordinary employees are recognized
and afforded the benefits of the NLRA. For this reason, the Board, in deciding
whether to exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction,20 should consider the
27. ILGWU Brief, p. 45. There is material in the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act that gives some weight to this argument. E.g.: "Management, like labor, must
have faithful agents." 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REiATirouS
AcT 307 (1948). [Hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. OF LMRA). See also id. at 304-08, 409-11.
This delusive sense of symmetry underlies an offer by Representative Griffin to President
Dubinsky to sponsor an amendment to Taft-Hartley exempting business agents from the
employee class should the ILGWU lose its court battle. Justice, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 8, col. 4.
28. The House Committee on Education and Labor reported:
The evidence shows that foremen's unions are, and must be, wholly dependent upon
rank-and-file unions and under constant obligation to them. The foremen cannot
strike without the support of the rank and file and its agreement not to do the work
of striking foremen.
1 LEG. HIST. OF LMRA 306-07. The committee found on the basis of much testimony that
the foremens unions developed "at the expense of the foreman's fidelity in doing his duties."
Ibid.
29. The range of certification cases in which the Board has considered the possibility
of exercising its discretion is quite narrow; it does not appear that the Board considered
this question in passing on FOUR's petition. That the Board ought to have considered this
question is indicated by the Supreme Court's opinion in Office Employees' Int'l Union v.
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probable effects of staff union recognition in the light of the general policies
expressed in -the national labor legislation o as well as the policies underlying
the exclusion of supervisors and managerial employees from the coverage of the
act. The latter considerations go to the question whether jurisdiction can, not
should, be exercised.
The principal policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to foster collective
organization and establish conditions under which unions can effectively repre-
sent and pursue the interests of the employees in the bargaining unit."1 But the
NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). There, while it reversed the Board's rule declining jurisdiction
over labor unions as employers, the Court recognized that the Board could properly decline
to assert jurisdiction if "' the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion
of jurisdiction in that case," id. at 318, quoting Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341
U.S. 675, 684 (1951). Four Justices, dissenting in part, argued that the Board did have dis-
cretionary authority to exclude union employers as a class from the coverage of the act.
Finding the Board's reasoning unconvincing, however, they urged remand for reconsidera-
tion. Under either view, the Board, in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction, should
consider the probable effects of staff union recognition in the light of the policies expressed in
the national labor legislation.
30. NLRA § 14(c) (1), an amendment added by Landrum-Griffin, explicitly confers
discretion on the Board with a proviso:
The Board, in its discretion, may ... decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute involving any class or category of employers, where in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided; That the Board shall not decline
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction
under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
The proviso has been interpreted in Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 294 F.2d 251 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), where the court upheld the NLRB's refusal to assert jurisdiction over a petition
for a representation election filed by a proprietary hospital. The Court said that the Board
could refuse to assert jurisdiction "unless prior to August 1, 1959 the Board had established a
jurisdictional standard affirmatively including such institutions." Id. at 255. The fact that
the Board had taken jurisdiction of occasional disputes before 1959 does not establish a "pre-
vailing standard" under this section. Thus the scattered decisions of the Board prior to
August, 1959 asserting jurisdiction over staff unions do not limit the Board's discretion.
The grant of discretion in NLRA § 14(c) (1) should not be read as limiting the Board's
discretion to situations in which the effect of the dispute on commerce is insubstantial. The
Board has properly continued to decline jurisdiction where the policies of the NLRA
would not be effectuated by assertion for other reasons. In Sheltered Workshops of San
Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. 961, 964 (1960), the Board declined jurisdiction over a nonprofit enter-
prise on the basis of the policies of the act, without considering in detail the substantiality
of the effect on commerce. Clearly, the Board should have authority to decline jurisdiction
in a case where assertion would frustrate the act's purposes. For example, in Hamilton
Bros., 133 N.L.R-B. 868, 871 (1961), the Board properly considered the policies of the act
in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over flag-of-convenience labor disputes. There
are, however, statements which might be construed as meaning that the Board considered
its discretion limited to a consideration of the effect on commerce. E.g., 26 NTLRB An.
REP. 22 (1961) ; West India Fruit & S.S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 343, 370-71 (1961).
31. Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or inter-
ruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources
of industrial strife and unrest and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-




act also recognizes that a union has certain obligations to its own employees
when it acts as an employer8 2 Cases may arise where the question whether the
Board should assert jurisdiction over staff unions will necessitate a preference
for one of these two policies. Exercising jurisdiction over the collective activi-
ties of business agents, however, does not appear to pose such a conflict.
Recognition of a union representing business agents could impair the em-
ploying union's effective representation of the rank and file either by curtailing
the employing union's power freely to fire business agents, if the staff union
obtained a good cause provision,83 or by disrupting the union's operation
through a strike. As to most functions of business agents, such as policing the
collective agreement and servicing the locals, the inclusion of a good cause
provision in a collective agreement would not substantially undermine the ef-
ficiency with which they are performed. Although the increase in job security
flowing from a good cause provision might make business agents somewhat
less diligent in the performance of these tasks, this loss should be offset by an
improvement in morale.
The effect of a good cause provision may, however, be more pronounced on the
business agents' function as liaison between the administration and the rank and
file. The business agents relay reports of the rank and file's problems and dis-
satisfactions to the administration and also inform the members of administra-
tion policies and proposals. There is no reason to expect a significant loss of
efficiency in communications to the administration, but the downstream report-
ing of administration proposals may no longer be as satisfactory, at least to the
incumbent administration. Of principal significance in this function is the will-
ingness of business agents to present administration proposals in a favorable
light. Even if a failure to report administration proposals with zeal were thought
to be good cause for dismissal, such a cause for dismissal would be difficult to
prove. This loss in enthusiastic presentation of the administration's proposals
and edicts could be somewhat offset by the use of other channels of communi-
cation, such as the union newspaper or -the elected local officers.
The possibility of a strike of the staff union may be thought to present a
more serious threat to the efficiency of the employing union. Because of the
limited resources and power of a staff union, at least in its early stages, how-
ever, strikes, especially protracted ones, are not very likely. Moreover, business
32. "The term 'employer' . . shall not include.., any labor organization (other than
when acting as an employer)....
NLRA § 2(2).
33. A staff union should be able to get a dismissal for a good cause provision in their
collective agreement. Such a clause has become standard in union contracts, and the em-
ploying union would be unlikely to contest a matter so fundamental to unlon. Of the 400
collective agreements studied in a 1960 survey conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs
71% of them contained some kind of good cause provision. 46 LRRM 23-24.
A good cause provision would not, of course, entirely insulate the business agent from
improper administration pressures. By the use of discriminatory transfers and other mea-
sures, the administration could still exert a large measure bf control over the business agents.
But the good cause provision does give them considerable independence.
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agents might be reluctant to strike since they can be readily replaced by local
officers or other members of the employing union. Presumably these members
would consider performing the business agents' function as something other
than strike-breaking, since their action would be authorized by their elected
leaders and would serve the interests of their own union. Because the replace-
ments would initially not be completely familiar with the tasks performed by
business agents, some delays in processing grievances and in enforcing the
collection agreement may be expected. But such delays are likely to be short
since the skills of a business agent can be readily acquired.
In concluding that recognition of a staff union would probably not signifi-
cantly impair the efficiency of the employing union, no consideration so far
has been given to the business agents' political function. It is in this area,
which concerns the internal political processes of the employing union rather
than the fulfillment of its responsibility as bargaining representative, that
recognition of staff unions would probably have its most significant impact.
The real authority for decision-making and policy-formulation in today's
unions clearly lies in the administration.3 4 With the aid of an efficient
bureaucracy, the incumbent officers have substantially restricted the opportunity
for voicing opposing views. Notwithstanding the preservation of democratic
forms, 35 the administration is often not responsive to the opinions and desires of
the members.3 6 Protest by members of the rank and file is regarded as dis-
34. LipSEr, TRow & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY ch. 1 (1956) ; Herberg, Bureaucracy
and Democracy in Labor Unions, in SHisTER, READINcS r LABoR EcoNomcs AnD Izz-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS 114 (1956); Seidman, Demnocracy in Labor Unions, in SmsrM, op.
cit. supra at 122.
35. A graphic example of the preservation of the democratic form without the sub-
stance is contained in the ILGWU constitution, art. 8, § 6. This section permits caucuses
of members but only for the three month period before an election. As has been pointed out,
this provision cripples any organized opposition to the administration. See LipsEr, Tnow &
CoLasrm , op. cit. supra note 33, at 239-40. See also Lmsmson, Ax&meAN TRA"E UmoN-
DzsocRAcy 233-34 (1959). The ILGWU art. 8, § 6 was enacted in the wake of the struggle
with the Communists in the union in order to avoid self-destructive dual-unionism, but it
has outlived that purpose. For example, a caucus organized to protest the termination of
the Yiddish edition of Justice was broken up under this article of the constitution. Benson,
When Organizers Organize, in REPRI Nrs ON UNIoN DIoCRAcY iN AcrIo.N No. 2, at 2.
36. Most large unions ... approximate the state of the masses in their lack of mediating
organizations between the administration and the individual members. The average
large trade union contains only one formal organization, the union apparatus itself,
and a mass of individual members.... It is perhaps paradoxical that the very organiza-
tions which allow workers to act collectively in their relations with employers are
ordinarily so constructed that within them the members are usually unable to act
collectively in dealing with their leaders.
Lirszr, TRow & Cozam",. op. cit. siupra note 33, at 77. An absence of membership control
over policy formulation is suggested by the charitable donations of the ILGWVU. Although
the size of the contribution is itself admirable, the distribution shows little regard for the
needs and interests of a large part of the membership. See Jacobs, David Dubinshy: Why
His Throne is Wobbling, Harper's Magazine, Dec. 1962, p. 75, at 84.
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loyalty,37 and organized opposition is discredited as factionalism or dual union-
ism.38
The business agents play an essential role in maintaining these decision-
making prerogatives of the administration by informal pressures at the local
level, where their advocacy carries great weight. They urge loyalty to the
administration and its program, campaign for the incumbents, and seek to
head off factional challenges. In the absence of a staff union, the business agent
holds his job at the will of the employing union, a situation which insures the
diligent pursuit of the business agents' political tasks. Combined with the ad-
ministration's practical monopoly over communication, this political machine
makes opposition virtually impossible. A complete evaluation of the conse-
quences of recognizing a staff union requires consideration of these internal
political processes. And this, in turn, suggests that the NLRB, in deciding
whether to decline jurisdiction over a staff union, should look to the Landrum-
Griffin Act, which expresses a national policy of encouraging union democ-
racy.
9
Since the effective performance of political functions by the business agent on
behalf of the administration tends to frustrate the legislative policy in favor of
37. The notion that internal political conflict may be more than an unpleasant interlude
in the course of an otherwise stable and settled organizational history, the idea that
political conflict may itself have value for the organization within which it is waged
and that the conditions under which it may flourish ought to be created and pre-
served-these sentiments and values, which lie at the heart of Western parliamentary
democratic theory, are not widely held in such organizations as trade unions.
LiPsan, TROW & CoLM N, op. ci. supra note 33, at 241.
38. The debate with FOUR has been carried on by the ILGWU administration in this
rhetorical style. President Dubinsky has asked: "Shall we permit Troskyite factionalism in
our union?" N.Y. Times, May 31, 1962, p. 18, col. 3. The ILGWU newspaper, Justice, in an,
editorial "To Set the Record Straight," wrote that FOUR "is a faction of officers with all the
elements of a dual union... " It cites the union's "long and bitter experiences" with a Com-
munist faction in' justifying its actions against FOUR. Justice, Aug. 1, 1962, p. 12. Lipset,
Trow & Coleman cite the ILGWU as "a notable and clear example" of the correlation of
the fight against a Communist faction and, the destruction of internal democracy. LIrs.T,
TROW & COLEMAN, op. cit. . upra note 33, at 248.
39. See H. R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959), in 1 LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOsuRE ACT OF 1959, at 765 (1959) :
[I]t is essential that union practices and procedures be democratic and that they
recognize and protect the basic rights of the union members and the employees repre-
sented by unions.
Senator McClellan made the same point, in submitting his Bill of Rights:
... I deem it appropriate that we insure by lav internal democracy in unions and pro-
vide for proper protection of union members and their rights.... If unions are to
have such federally bestowed, tremendous power in industrial government, they
should be compelled by law to represent their members in accordance with democratic
principles.
2 LEuisLATIvE HISTORY OF LMRDA OF 1959, at 1098 (1959). Given this declared legislative
policy in favor of union democracy, a consideration of the wisdom or practieability of such
policy is beyond the scope of this Note. For an incisive discussion of these problems, see
generally LiPsr, TROW & COLEMAN, op. cit. mipra note 33.
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union democracy, relaxation of the control of the incumbents over the political
activity of the business agents would seem desirable.40 There are several ways
in which recognition, and therefore protection of the organizational and collec-
tive activities of business agents, might provide an impetus to more democratic
practices in the employing union. If the parties agreed to an open-ended good
cause provision, which left the specific content of the provision to be filled in by
the arbitrator, the arbitrator would be free to draw on the policy of the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act in construing the collective agreement. Section 401(g) of
Landrum-Griffin provides that "no moneys received by any labor organization
... shall be... applied to promote the candidacy of any person in an election
.... -" This section dearly applies to a business agent's political activity in
campaigning for incumbents during the period immediately preceding election
and may apply to other forms of union political activities. In addition, the over-
all intent of title IV of Landrum-Griffin is to equalize opportunities for elective
office in the union, eliminating the gross advantages possessed by the incum-
bents. Thus, relying on this policy of Landrum-Griffin, arbitrators would prob-
ably decide that failure by a business agent to perform the political function is
not good cause for dismissal. Such a decision might also impair the business
agent's performance of his function of communicating administration policy to
the rank and file, since a line between favorable reporting and campaigning
would be virtually impossible to draw. But, as noted above, this function can
be accomplished in other ways.2 If the employing union, foreseeing the conse-
quences of a general good cause provision or reacting to reinstatements of per-
sons dismissed for political reasons, obtained a specific provision permitting
dismissal of business agents for failure to perform a political function, such a
provision would probably be denied enforcement in a reinstatement proceeding
on the ground that it contravenes the policy of Landrum-Griffin.
Although union democracy may be advanced by freeing the business agents
from coerced political activity, it is not clear that protecting business agents
in carrying on voluntary political activities would be similarly beneficial or in
accord with any national policy.43 Owing to their daily grass-roots contact with
40. Section 501 (a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, imposing a fidiciary responsibility on
business agents, does not impair their right to organize. This section is grounded on the com-
mon law concept of fiduciary duty which prohibits a fiduciary from representing an adverse
interest in the same transaction. This section certainly does not proscribe an agent's seek-
ing a salary increase, a dealing in which he treats the union as an adverse party; and organ-
ization for collective bargaining does not make the business agent's interest more adverse. See
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Undcr the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 McH. L
REv. 819, 827-29 (1960).
41. Section 401(g), 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (Supp. 111959).
42. See text beginning at note 32 supra.
43. The Council of Industrial Organizers, the bargaining representative of the staff
members of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, has played
an active role in IUE affairs, apparently with salutary effects. The job security which they
won has enabled them to avoid compelled participation in the internal political struggle
within the employing union. Individual staff members have taken independent positions
without reprisals, and the staff union itself has taken positions on the issues without siding
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the rank and file, business agents have an extraordinary amount of political
influence. To the extent that this influence is exerted to affect the outcome of
elections, an undemocratic element of another sort is introduced into the em-
ploying union's internal structure. Business agents often are not elected by the
rank and file. Moreover, their interests do not necessarily coincide with the
interests of the employing union's membership. And by using their concerted
political support as leverage for an especially favorable agreement, business
agents may gain an advantage in collective bargaining that does not result from
economic strength.
These considerations suggest that voluntary political activities of business
agents should be inhibited. This could be accomplished by construing dis-
missals for this form of political activity as within the scope of good cause.
Section 401(g), which proscribes the use of union funds to support the
candidacy of any person,44 supports this conclusion, although it may not apply
to all forms of voluntary political activity by business agents. It is unrealistic,
however, to expect that all voluntary political activity could be eliminated. The
practical effect of construing a good cause provision to permit the dismissal of
business agents for individual political activity would more likely be the dis-
missal of only those business agents who opposed the administration, thus
giving the administration a net political advantage. Although this may be pre-
ferable to the present situation in which the incumbents command total sup-
port, it seems less desirable than permitting the business agents to engage
freely in individual political activity. In the latter case, support for the ad-
ministration by some business agents would be offset by the opposition of
others. Furthermore, individual voluntary political activity, by stimulating dis-
cussion of current union problems, might have a salutary effect on union
democracy. This leads to the conclusion that a dismissal for individual political
activity should not be deemed a dismissal for good cause. Similarly, if the em-
ploying union obtained a specific provision permitting dismissals for voluntary
political activity, such a provision should be construed strictly against the em-
ploying union in order to minimize the opportunity to gain the political support
of the business agents by using selective dismissals. This construction would
also decrease the possibility that such a provision would be abused by an em-
ploying union's casting all dismissals in the guise of dismissals for voluntary
political activity.
The potential adverse effects of concerted political activity by a staff union
on the union democratic process appear more serious. But the formulation of
effective remedies to regulate this activity presents less of a problem. Where
the staff union engages in such activity, the NLRB could suspend the bargain-
with either faction. SLx staff members were fired recently, but this apparently was because
they refused, in violation of the IUE constitution, to obey President James Carey, and not
simply because of their anti-Carey political activities. Letter from Angelo Colella, President
of the Council of Industrial Organizers, to the Yale Law Journal, Dec. 24, 1962, on file in
Yale Law Library; Telephone Interview with Mr. Colella, March 3, 1963.
44. See text at note 40 supra.
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ing privileges of the staff union for a limited period of time.45 It probably
could not, however, enjoin such activity as an unfair labor practiceA0 But the
first remedy is preferable to the Board's declining jurisdiction absolutely, for
that would only insure the perpetuation of the marked advantages of incum-
bency. Where the staff union opposes the incumbent administration, the em-
ploying union presumably will file an appropriate complaint with the NLRB.
Even if the staff union is supporting the administration, the number of people
who might benefit by Board intervention-including dissident members of the
two unions involved-ensures that a complaint will be filed. The definition of
the nature and intensity of concerted political activity that would justify Board
intervention can be worked out in practice. A decision to decertify would prob-
ably be based upon such factors as whether the staff union has taken a position
on candidates rather than issues, whether it has taken a position in its official
capacity, whether it has an immediate interest in the issues on which the posi-
tion has been taken, and the extent of the harm which the employing union
would suffer by virtue of the particular activity involved.
In view of the fact that recognition of the staff union would afford substan-
tial benefits to the business agents individually, would not significantly impair
the efficiency of the employing union, and, most important, would have a
beneficial effect on the employing union's political structure-thereby imple-
menting the policy of Landrum-Griffin-it would seem that the Board should
not exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction.
45. The Board has asserted its authority to revoke the certification of unions in ap-
propriate cases, whether or not the union has engaged in an unfair labor practice. See
Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 322-24 (1953) ; Hughes Tool Co., Cases No. 23-CB-
429 & 23 RC-1758, Trial Examiner's Report. In A. 0. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621,
the Board revoked a union's certification for six months for failing to fairly represent
all the members of the bargaining unit. This sanction would effectively prevent a staff
union from excessively interferring in the internal affairs of the employing union.
46. Arguably, such concerted political activity might be a violation of NLRA § 8(b)
(1) (B), which prohibits restraining or coercing "an employer in the selection of his repre-
sentatives . . . ." If this interpretation seemed too strained and a substantial problem
developed due to staff union interference in employing unions, an amendment to the NLRA
making such activity an unfair labor practice could be sought. This provision would be the
analogue of NLRA § 8(a) (2), which prevents interference by the employer in the union's
affairs.
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